Friday, April 07, 2006

 

War in Iraq: What Do We Do Now?

The Nameless Tory:

The War on Iraq – What Do We Do Now?

The temptation is to run away. Iraq is drifting into Civil War, and our troops are dying to defend a country that seems bent on tearing itself apart. Look at highly emotive films like Fahrenheit 9/11 – the death of our troops is upsetting and traumatic. But Fahrenheit 9/11 is a piece of propaganda – there is no getting away from that. And it also fails to answer the key question of “what happens if the coalition pulls out?”

If we leave at this point I think the country will descend into Civil War. There will be rape, murder, ethnic cleansing and general anarchy that would really allow for terrorist training camps to be set up. A crucial land mass in the centre of the most troubled region in the world would be completely lawless. And whatever way you look at it, it would be a catastrophe for the Middle East and possibly the world.

There is also a moral argument attached to this. Disregarding whether or not it was right to invade Iraq (for the record I think removing Saddam Hussein was a good thing – what was reprehensibly stupid of the Bush-Blair Axis was to fail to take into account what might happen in Iraq and the complete failure to put in place any sort of exit strategy prior to invading) we now have a moral obligation to accept the consequences of our actions. We caused the anarchy in Iraq. We have a moral duty to stay until it is sorted out.

Two examples to illustrate this: America bombed Cambodia. Cambodia fell into the hands of the terrible Pol Pot. The US refused to accept responsibility for their actions. Millions were tortured and millions were murdered. This is what could happen if we leave Iraq. On the flip side we have the example of Northern Ireland. The UK stood its ground in the province, over generations. It cost the lives of both those in the army and those in civilian life, but the UK refused to retreat. And we are now in a position were peace finally seems to be on the cards. This could also happen if we stay in Iraq.

Therefore I would argue that the troops stay for as long as it takes to bring some semblance of order to Iraq. We caused the problems, we sit tight until we have found a way to sort it out. It will cost us more lives, but those in the army accept the risks involved when they join up.

It will be hard, it could take decades, but we stay.

That said, we do need to qualify the decision to stay in Iraq:

1. Those in Iraq are equipped properly. If our troops are fighting for us, they should have every resource available to protect themselves.

2. Our leaders accept the reality of what is going on in Iraq. The Vietnam War was not called a war for a very long time, and the troops there were observers for too long. The US government refused to acknowledge the war they were in. And we all know what that refusal to accept reality ended in. Iraq is, realistically, in Civil War. Let’s face the fact, so we can deal with the fact.

3. Iraq’s leaders should be pushed and prepared to take over government and the effective running of the country as soon as possible.

4. If we have to raise the troop numbers in Iraq to guarantee the safety of the troops who are already there, or to help achieve our overall aims (or both), we do so. Bringing troops home is a good headline, sending more out is bad. But again – face reality – if it has to be done, then let’s do it. This is war, not a media exercise.

Oh, and we do not embark on any other Middle East campaigns until the mess in Iraq is sorted. And if we need to deal with Iran etc in the future, we remember Iraq. At the moment Iraq is called “another Vietnam”. Let’s not have Iran described in the future as “another Iraq.”


The Moai:


There are a number of parts to this problem. Firstly, when one looks at the narrative that drew us into all this, it appears that nobody planned for what is happening now.

In contrast, look at Bosnia, where the aim was explicitly bringing about peace and stabilizing the nation. Quietly, with little media attention (well all the war correspondents are in Basra), the Balkans nations are making their way in the world. The British, Dutch and Scandinavian soldiers there established and enforced a peace that has now become self-sustaining. Nations that, 15 years ago, were knee-deep in bodies, are now sending singers to the Eurovision Song Contest. The peace keeping experience of British troops in Northern Ireland was invaluable in the Balkans.

So, why are the Balkan nations making their way, but Iraq is tearing itself apart? Well, for a start, it has been made plain to the Serbians et al that peace is far more profitable than war. They stand to gain far more, as individuals and as a nation, if they join the other nations of Europe, just over their borders. Secondly, they are surrounded on all sides by supportive, functioning democracies. Finally, nations *could* coherently be formed because a certain re-drawing of borders was possible (witness the division of the former Yugoslavia).

Contrast Iraq. At least four distinct ethnic groups within a nation whose borders were drawn arbitrarily, and are unlikely to be redefined. No functioning democracy nearby (save Israel) and a lot of people who stand to gain, actively, from continuing violence. Finally, the incendiary effect of radical Islamic sects. For all these reasons, what worked in the Balkans, and for that matter in post-WW2 Europe and in Japan will not work. In fact, I am struggling to think of an accurate, successful historical precedent - as you point out, we really don't want a Cambodia/Vietnam rerun. The transition from the Byzantine to the Ottoman Empire may be instructive. Anyway, I digress.

It seems as if George and his best mate Tony waded in without considering if many people in Iraq *wanted* western-style democracy; and anyway, one cannot create such a system overnight. That system of government relies on an appropriate body of law, officials who understand what it means, and a population who are engaged with the expectations of the ballot box. Iraq has none of these factors.

As this shows the US seems to be slowly accepting the truth of the situation, and what actually has to happen after a war. It seems self evident that GWB had no clue what would happen in the power vacuum after Saddam's fall; he has now been forced to engage with those who stepped into that vacuum, however distasteful they may be.

Finally, the tendency to replace jargon for a physical plan cannot be ignored.

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